As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of BP Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes [24 Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408, 416 [1995]].and so is the crime of estafa. 25.    Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 278, 284 [1971]. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 26 [Lim vs. Court of Appeals, supra.]

Justice Hermosisima, Jr.,  FIRST DIVISION, ANTONIO NIEVA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 95796-97.  May 2, 1997.]

Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review in certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value.  [6 Id., pp. 19-22.]

As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.  [ 7 U.S. v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376-378 (1913)]. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. [8 Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27124, 29 May 1970, 33 SCRA 186] And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.   [9 People v. Galano, No. L-42925, 31 January 1977, 75 SCRA 193.]

In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case.

We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 10.        People v. Gorospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [11Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.  112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639.] Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.

In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.

In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction.

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charge or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. [12 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.]

After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum [13 Rollo. pp. 103-104] before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the abovequoted law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or an appeal. [14 Suy Sui v. People, 49 O.G. 967]

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case [15 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29] in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez, [16.No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399, Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, 27 OCTOBER 1989, 145 SCRA 211]. the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. [17 People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 750, citing Calimlim v. Ramirez, No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399].

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18 [ibid]

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. 19 [ibid]

Justice Belosillo, First Division, Rosa Uy v. CA and People G.R. No. 119000.  July 28, 1997.

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such. it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. 21 The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check or that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property had there been no check issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 22

It will be recalled that petitioner has been in possession of the dump truck as early as April 30, 1985. The property had been delivered to and obtained by petitioner initially for the purpose of having the same repaired by the petitioner so that it could be rented out to him. When it turned out, however, that the same was not repaired nor the rentals therefor paid, Atty. Joven demanded that it be returned and what dissuaded him from taking it away from petitioner in order to be brought back to Bacolor, Pampanga was petitioner's offer to buy the same. The offer having been accepted with the consideration having also been agreed upon, Atty. Joven let the dump truck remain in the possession of petitioner. An absolute deed of sale was accordingly executed and entered into by the parties on June 10, 1985, during which Atty. Joven did not ask for payment. As has heretofore been clearly shown, petitioner issued and delivered to Atty. Joven the postdated check in payment of the dump truck a week later. Needless to state, it was not by reason of the issuance of the check that petitioner has remained to be in possession of the dump truck but the perfected contract of sale entered into by petitioner and Atty. Joven a week earlier than the issuance of the check.

In fine, we find and so hold that petitioner did not commit the fraud or deceit envisioned in the law as to make him liable for estafa when he issued the postdated check, such issuance having been clearly made in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

We, however, sustain petitioner's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

It bears stressing that while this is also an appeal on petitioner's conviction of the offense under BP Blg. 22, the arguments in his brief, except on the issue of jurisdiction, had not dwelt thereon. Nevertheless, we note that upon the facts adduced, his conviction of the said offense is proper.

The elements of the offense under Section 1, BP Blg. 22, are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 23.    People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305, 310 [1989].

It will be noted that BP Blg. 22 requires that the drawer of the check must have knowledge at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. Under Section 2 thereof, the making, drawing and issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check. However, the prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency does not lie when the maker or drawer pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

It has been established in this case that petitioner issued to Atty. Joven the postdated check — CBM Check No. 015417 dated July 31, 1985 in the amount of P70,000.00 as payment for the dump truck sold by Atty. Joven to him. He knew that he had no funds with the bank to cover the said check at the time be issued or postdated it, such knowledge being evident from his own admission that the check would be funded from out of his collectibles from the Development Bank of the Philippines but which, however, did not materialize as expected, not to mention the legal presumption of such knowledge arising from the dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds. The check was presented for payment on August 2, 1985 or within 90 days from date of issue and the same was dishonored by reason of "closed account" stamped on its face. Petitioner did not pay Atty. Joven the amount due on the check despite demand; neither did he make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within five (5) banking days after notice of non-payment.

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of BP Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes [24 Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408, 416 [1995]].and so is the crime of estafa. 25.    Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 278, 284 [1971]. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 26 [Lim vs. Court of Appeals, supra.]

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court in Criminal Case No. 3228 is hereby REVERSED and petitioner Antonio Nieva, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision in Criminal Case No. 3229 sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Justice Hermosisima, FIRST DIVISION, ANTONIO NIEVA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 95796-97.  May 2, 1997.