In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much more, had any “transaction” with her.  According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan.  She gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a “security arrangement” or “guarantee” that she would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.¹⁶ [Rollo, p. 13.]

The appeal has no merit.

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:¹⁷ [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000.]

“(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

“(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

“(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.”

Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks.  She argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing transaction.  The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.¹⁸ [Rollo, p. 13.] These defenses cannot save the day for her.  The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present.  To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient.  She did not prove this.

B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first an third elements of the offense are present.¹⁹ [B.P. 22, Section 2 provides, “Sec. 2 Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of Knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.²⁰ [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.]

The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.  And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.²¹ [King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.] The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.²² [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.] Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief.²³ Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, 351 (1999).] Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability.  The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.²⁴ [Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 (1997).]

Unlike in estafa,²⁵ [People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999.] under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage.  The damage done is to the banking system.²⁶ [Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 658 (1998).]

In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita²⁷ [United States v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 131 (1909).]--

“… it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent.  In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.  This is necessarily so.  If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless.  It would be impossible of execution.  In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid.   In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad.”

This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita.  Petitioner issued two checks.  They were dishonored upon presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was closed.  Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks.  And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor.  B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated.  Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est.  The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.  

En Banc, Justice Pardo, ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, [G.R. No. 130038.  September 18, 2000]  

Undaunted, the petitioner is before this court for the reversal of the aforesaid judgments convicting him. Invoking the ruling in Magno vs. CA (210 SCRA 471 [1992]), petitioner maintains that he cannot be convicted for violation of B.P. 22 because several factors militate against a strict application of the mala prohibita doctrine, viz.: (1) the checks were not issued "to apply on account or for value" but as mere warranty deposits to guarantee his obligation in the new partnership; (2) that the profits of the business of the partnership have more than paid his (petitioner's) account for the baking materials he bought, for the payment of which subject checks were issued. 

 As the drawer of the dishonored checks complained of, although intended merely as a guarantee deposit, the petitioner is liable under B.P. Blg 22.

A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ." (Cruz vs. CA, 233 SCRA 307 [1994])

When a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank normally honors the same whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation.

What is penalized by law is the issuance of a bouncing check. The mere act of issuing an unfunded check is a malum prohibitum. (ibid., p. 301)

In Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160, the court ruled:

"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. . . .

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee."  

and in People vs. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 84, ratiocinated:

"We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not to be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls due. The understanding may be manifested by writing across the check 'Memorandum', 'Memo' or 'Mem'. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. . . ." (G.R. No. 116566, CA Decision dated December 29, 1993, Rollo, pp. 52-53)

The importance of arresting the proliferation of bouncing checks can not be overemphasized. The mischief of circulating unfunded checks is injurious not only to the payee or holder of such checks but to society in general, and the business community, in particular. The nefarious practice "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." (Cruz vs. CA, supra, p. 308)

Petitioner's stance that the complainant tried to enrich herself unjustly by collecting on already paid checks is anemic of evidentiary support. No evidence of any weight whatsoever was introduced to show a set-off or compensation of the monetary obligations for which the checks in question were issued. It has been established indubitably that the petitioner had drawn and issued the said checks in favor of the complainant as payment of the flour and other baking materials the former bought from the latter. When such checks were deposited, they were all dishonored and returned by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed." (TSN, pp. 22-24, July 6, 1994)

The straightforward testimony of the complainant that she agreed with petitioner to redate the same checks, after he pleaded for an extension of time for the payment thereof, is worthy of belief. Had the indebtedness covered by the checks sued upon been paid, the petitioner would have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business. (Section 3 [q] Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines) But the same checks remained in the possession of the complainant who asked for the satisfaction of the obligations involved when said checks became due without the petitioner heeding the demand for him to redeem his checks which bounced.   

Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in the case of Magno vs. Court of Appeals (supra) is misplaced. In said case the accused, who was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, was provided with credit facilities by LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from MANCOR the needed equipments. As part of their arrangement, LS Finance required a 30% warranty deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments to be transacted upon, and the accused subsequently issued checks to collateralize an accommodation made by Corazon Teng (Vice President of MANCOR) amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred (P29,700.00) Pesos as warranty deposit but the said checks bounced. Found guilty under B.P. Blg. 22, the court stressed, on appeal, that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by the accused who was just paying rental on the equipments. To charge him for the refund of a "warranty deposit" he did not withdraw because it was not his own account and it remained with LS Finance, would be to make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since he did not actually receive the amount involved.

In the present case, the petitioner issued the bouncing checks in question to cover the receipt of an actual "account or for value". The checks were issued to pay for the flour and other baking materials which he purchased from the complainant.

THIRD DIVISION, Justice Purisima, DOMINGO DICO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 116566 & 120149.  April  14, 1999.]

True, it is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment, or as evidence of indebtedness, if not a mode of payment. But to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. 8 So, what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.  [9]  Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, June 17, 1994, G.R. No. 108738, 233 SCRA 301.

Justice Torres, SECOND DIVISION, RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.,[G.R. No. 99032.  March 26, 1997.]

The argument on petitioner's second issue has likewise no leg to stand on. On this argument that he issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of which he is the Manager, We give our stamp of approval on the findings of the appellate court, to wit:

"Neither may appellant's claim in his second assignment of error that the accused issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. serve to exculpate accused from criminal liability for his act of issuing the checks in question.

"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record) First Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036)

"Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee." (pp. 4-5. Dec. IAC) (pp. 37-38, Rollo)

From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

Justice Paras, SECOND DIVISION, VICTOR QUE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 75217-18.  September 21, 1987.