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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BP 22

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Bouncing checks law covers all kinds of checks.

The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.

Essential elements of Knowledge under BP 22; Prima facie presumed by refusal of the drawee to pay upon presentment.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check.

Prima facie presumption shall not arise when payment is made within five (5) days from receipt of dishonor.

To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Dishonor of check by the drawee bank; prima facie proof of making or issuance of check and due presentment thereof

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefore, shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof . . . for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawer on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

BP 22 is distinguished from Estafa under Art. 315, Revised penal Code.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of estafa reads as follows: "Article 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by . . . 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits; . . . (d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check without informing the payee of such circumstances." The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations. The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. In issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive any material benefit in return or as consideration for its issuance. On the part of the payee, he had already parted with his money or property before the check is issued to him, hence, he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him, by the drawer of the check.

Estafa under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4885; Payment of pre-existing obligations not covered.

Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the concept underlying the crime of estafa through false pretense or deceit - which is, that the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.

Thrust of BP 22 is to punish act of making or issuing worthless check as an offense against public order

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them is circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Legislature may prescribe criminal punishment for acts inimical to public welfare as malum prohibitum.

It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt excontractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and it is not repugnant to constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreason able the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The effect of the issuance of a worthless checks transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. In sum, we find the enactment of B.P. 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Freedom of contract is not impaired by BP 22; Checks not categorized as contracts.

We find not valid ground to sustain the contention that B.P. 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it form part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

Equal protection of law does not preclude classification of individuals.

Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws". The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

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