Anent the ejectment case, the one-year reglementary period under Section 1, Rule 70  22 [The 1964 Revised Rules of Court] for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs upon expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. And such right legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to vacate 23 [ See Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil. 777]

In this case, although possession by petitioners (other than Villaluz) lasted beyond March 31, 1988 (the date they were supposed to vacate the premises in accordance with the agreement between petitioner Villaluz and private respondents),24 [ Rollo, p. 232]  nevertheless their continued possession from April 1, 1988 up to the time they received the demand to vacate on February 23, 1989,  25 [ Rollo, p. 234] is considered as possession by tolerance. Said petitioners are not lessees but their status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Their right of possession of the said property stems from their being employees of petitioner Villaluz who only allowed them to occupy the premises for a certain period. As such, their possession depends upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz. Having merely stepped into the shoes of the latter, said petitioners cannot acquire superior rights than that of petitioner Villaluz. It has been ruled, that "the person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand," otherwise the remedy of ejectment may be availed of to oust him from the premises. 26 [ Refugia v. CA, 258 SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De Lara, 6 SCRA 785 (1962)]  In such case, the one year prescriptive period for filing the appropriate action to remedy the unlawful withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of receipt of the last demand to vacate 27 [Calubayan v. Pascual, 215 SCRA 146]  because it is only from that time that possession becomes illegal. 28 [ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, 14 SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36] Accordingly, since the complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12, 1989,  29 [Petition, p. 26; Rollo, p. 33] or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last demand to vacate, the same was timely filed within the prescriptive period.

Finally, petitioners (other than Villaluz) argue that the civil aspect in the B.P. 22 case constitutes a prejudicial question to the ejectment suit because the ownership of the premises subject of the latter suit is allegedly being disputed in the former case. The argument is not meritorious. The ejectment suit can stand on its own regardless of the outcome of the civil case in B P. 22. The resolution of either is not determinative of the other. This is so because private respondents were already the owners of the properties subject of the ejectment suit by virtue of the Deeds of Sale executed between the former and petitioner Villaluz. 30 Rollo, pp. 71-72; 228-229. The certificates of title issued in private respondents' name further confirm their ownership.  31 [TCT 127633 and 127630, (Rollo, pp. 73-74)] As owners, they may initiate legal action to recover possession thereof from an occupant who can show no right to occupy the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the assailed consolidated case is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.