Section 14 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides: "SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.

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The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court null and void.

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The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835, 837).

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents, [G.R. Nos. L-74053-54.  January 20, 1988.]