Where a check was issued in Manila but when delivered and presented in due course for payment at the depository bank at Baguio City, the same was dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction to try the case. The venue of the offense lies at the place where a check was executed and delivered to the payee. The place where a check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof, which is the final act essential to its consummation. The delivery contemplated by law must be to the person who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." 

See Lim v. Judge Rodrigo, G.R. No. 76974, November 18, 1988.

Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review in certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value.  [6 Id., pp. 19-22.]

As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.  [ 7 U.S. v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376-378 (1913)]. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. [8 Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27124, 29 May 1970, 33 SCRA 186] And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.   [9 People v. Galano, No. L-42925, 31 January 1977, 75 SCRA 193.]

In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case.

We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 10.        People v. Gorospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [11Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.  112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639.] Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.

In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.

In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction.

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charge or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. [12 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.]

After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum [13 Rollo. pp. 103-104] before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the abovequoted law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or an appeal. [14 Suy Sui v. People, 49 O.G. 967]

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case [15 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29] in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez, [16.No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399, Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, 27 OCTOBER 1989, 145 SCRA 211]. the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. [17 People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 750, citing Calimlim v. Ramirez, No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399].

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18 [ibid]

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. 19 [ibid]

Justice Belosillo, First Division, Rosa Uy v. CA and People G.R. No. 119000.  July 28, 1997.

In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was that all the elements of the offense were committed in Kalookan City. The checks were issued at their place of business, received by a collector of LINTON, and dishonored by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever supports the proposition that they knew that their checks were insufficiently funded. In fact, some of the checks were funded at the time of presentment but dishonored nonetheless upon their instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine, considering that the checks were all issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried the case and rendered judgment thereon.

The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. . .." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless check  19 [Cruz V. MC, G.R. No. 66327, 28 May 1984, 129 SCRA 490] Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in  20 [Lozano V. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323; Dingle v. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, 16 March 1987, 148 SCRA 595] or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.  21 [People v. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 279]

It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction.  22 [Lopez v. City Judge, No. l-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA; U.S. v. Pagadayuman, 5 Phil. 265 (1905); U.S. v. Reyes, 1 Phil. 249 (1902); Ragpala v. J.P. of Tubo, Lanao, 109 Phil. 265 (1905); Agbayani v. Sayo, No. L-47889, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 699] Section 14, par. (a), Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Sec. 15, par. (a), Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:

Sec. 14.            Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.  23 [People v. Yabut, No. L-42902, 29 April 1977, 76 SCRA 624]There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other.   24 [Tuzon v. Cruz, No. L-27410, 28 August 1975, 66 SCRA 235]These are the so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 25 [People v. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 7405-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154]

In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime and requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7) checks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; (b) they were delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in Kaloocan City, it is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored.

Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a b- or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. In People v. Yabut  26 [Note 23, p. 629] this Court explained —

. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means '(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.' Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto . . .

Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City, they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee. As this Court further explained in People v. Yabut  27 [1d., p.630] —

Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Oue Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr., in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alida P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as 'payee' or 'indorsee.' And there appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that Yambao is but her 'messenger' or 'part-time employee.' There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential. The principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so as to act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent . . .

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds as follows —

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) barking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases before us because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People v. Grospe  28 [See Note 25] citing People v. Manzanilla  29 See Note 21. we held that ". . . knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another."

Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim V. Rodrigo  30 [G.R. No. 76974, 18 November 1988, 167 SCRA 487] that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.  31 Adm. Order No. 3 defines the territorial jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region by, inter aljci, establishing two branches over the municipalities of Malabon and Navotas with seats in Malabon.

We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 thus —

Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were not those specified by them. They maintain that they had sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The records of the bank, however, reveal otherwise. The two letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and August 10, 1983 which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial, complaining against the quality of the goods delivered by the latter, did not refer to the delivery of mild steel plates (6 mm x 4 x 8) and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which the checks in question were issued. Rather, the letters referred to B.1. Lally columns (Sch. #20), which were the subject of other purchase orders.

It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case brought by them against the complainant in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921) the complainant was held liable for actual damages because of the delivery of goods of inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the supplies involved in that case were those of B.1. pipes, while the purchases made by accused-appellants, for which they issued the checks in question, were purchases of mild steel plates and "Z" purlins.

Indeed, the only question here is whether accused-appellants maintained funds sufficient to cover the amounts of their checks at the time of issuance and presentment of such checks. Section 3 of B.P. Big. 22 provides that 'notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of dishonor that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of the check, if such be the fact.'

The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the maker or drawer of a worthless check from ordering the payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext for the lack of sufficient funds to cover the check.

In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the drawee bank, indicates not only that payment of the check was stopped but also that the reason for such order was that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with which to cover the checks. . . . Moreover, the bank ledger of accused-appellants' account in Consolidated Bank shows that at the time the checks were presented for encashment, the balance of accused-appellants' account was inadequate to cover the amounts of the checks.  32 [Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 1-17; Rollo, pp. 54-55]

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 September 1992 affirming the conviction of petitioners Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim —

Justice Bellosillo, FIRST DIVISION, MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, G.R. No. 107898.  December 19, 1995

Section 14 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides: "SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.

xxx

The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court null and void.

xxx

The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835, 837).

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents, [G.R. Nos. L-74053-54.  January 20, 1988.]

As ruled in the cases of People v. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987 and People v. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, January 20, 1988, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegation in the information under consideration that the offense was committed in Baguio City is therefore controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.

As held in the case of People v. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, the venue of the offense for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee and that the place where a chesk was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.

The "delivery" contemplated by law "must be to a person who takes it (the bad check) as holder, which means 'the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.'" Petitioner's brother, Vicente Lim, cannot be said to have taken the bad checks in question in the concept of a holder for he is neither the payee or indorsee thereof. Neither could he be deemed the agent of petitioner with respect thereto, for he was purposely sent to private respondent to get certain stock certificates and not the checks in dispute.

xxx

The sole issue in the petition at bar is; where does the venue lie in this particular prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22?

The parties are not at odds with respect to the applicability of the principles enunciated in the case of People v. Yabut, supra, that the venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee and that the place where a check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The disagreement springs from the parties' conflicting conclusions as to when and where delivery was effected in the case at bar.

Petitioner contends that delivery was completed in Baguio City as his brother Vicente Lim did not take the checks in question from private respondent as a holder nor as his agent; while the Solicitor General in representation of public respondents considers Vicente Lim as petitioner's agent so as to make the delivery of the checks to him in Manila, delivery likewise to petitioner.

We rule for the petitioner.

In the aforecited case of People v. Yabut, supra, this Court stated:

"Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr, in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as `payee' or `indorsee'. And there appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that Yambao is but her `messenger' or `part-time employee.' There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential, the principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so to act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent. This is more imperative when it is considered that the transaction dealt with involves checks, which are not legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of obligation." (at p. 630)

These observations and conclusions apply with full force and effect to the almost identical set of facts obtaining in the case at bar. The "delivery" contemplated by law "must be to a person who takes it (the bad check) as holder, which means 'the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.'" 3  [People v. Yabut, supra, People v. Grospe, supra] Petitioner's brother, Vicente Lim, cannot be said to have taken the bad checks in question in the concept of a holder for he is neither the payee or indorsee thereof. Neither could he be deemed the agent of petitioner with respect thereto, for he was purposely sent to private respondent to get certain stock certificates and not the checks in dispute. Thus, declared by Vicente Lim in his affidavit: 4.       Annex "F", Petition, p. 31, Rollo.

"5.        That at one time when I was asked again by my brother to purchase some of the vinyl portable closets, he asked me to get from Mr. Ko Hu certain stock certificates which the latter is supposed to deliver to my brother.

"6.        That instead of stock certificates, I was given several post-dated checks by Mr. Ko Hu to be delivered to my brother. In exchange of the post dated checks, I surrendered to Mr. Ko Hu a temporary receipt signed by him for the sum of P200,000.00;

"7.        That my brother was surprised to find out that I got several post-dated checks instead of stock certificates he was expecting;

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

The instructions given by petitioner to his brother relating specifically to stock certificates, Vicente Lim was constituted agent of petitioner, if at all, only with respect to said stock certificates. Such agency, assuming it existed, cannot be presumed to extend to the bad checks, for as earlier stated, "the transaction dealt with involves checks, which are not legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of obligation." 5   People v. Yabut, supra, People v. Grospe, supra.More so, as petitioner did not even expect the checks in question.

Upon these considerations, we rule that Vicente Lim, like Modesto Yambao in the Yabut case, is a mere messenger or conduit. Delivery to him cannot be considered as delivery to petitioner. Delivery was therefore effected to petitioner in Baguio City as to likewise fix the venue therein, aside from Manila where the checks were executed and subsequently dishonored.

Besides, it was held in People v. Hon. Manzanilla, supra, that as "violation of the bad checks act is committed when one 'makes or draws and issues any checks to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds' or having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . shall fail to keep sufficient funds o to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank,'" "knowledge" is an essential ingredient o the offense charged. As defined by the statute, knowledge, is by itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 2089-R (688).

CJ Fernan, THIRD DIVISION, BENITO LIM, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, Regional Trial Court Branch VII, First Judicial Region (Baguio City), La Trinidad, Benguet SILVESTRE H. BELLO III, Deputy Minister of Justice, CITY FISCAL OF BAGUIO AND KO HU, respondents, [G.R. No. 76974.  November 18, 1988.]

After joint arraignment, the Chuas moved to dismiss the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The trial court, then presided over by Judge Segundino Chua, denied the motion. 

Trial then proceeded, with the prosecution resting on September 23, 1982.

On June 21, 1983, the private respondents filed a second motion to dismiss insisting that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the two cases and that the evidence was insufficient to secure conviction.

On August 9, 1983, the trial court, with a new judge presiding, now respondent Judge Herberto A. Manzanilla, issued the first of the two challenged orders, dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction, the offenses having been allegedly consummated in Iloilo City. On October 18, 1983, he issued an order denying reconsideration.

According to the respondent judge, the jurisdiction to try the cases in question is vested in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City where the checks were dishonored. The people argue, on the other hand, that the checks were, nonetheless, delivered to the payee in Bacolod City.

While the parties raise a number of issues, we deem the jurisdictional question to be decisive in the appeal. On this regard, we find for the people.

Violation of the bad checks act is committed when one "makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds" or "having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank." 1 [Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Sec. 1, emphasis supplied.Contrary to the opinion of the respondent judge, dishonor is but one ingredient of the offense.   2.       People v. Veridiano II, No. L-62243, Oct. 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 523 (1984); Lozano v. Martinez, Nos. L-63419; 66839-42; 71654; 74524-25; 75122-49; 75812-13; 75765-67; 75789, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323 (1986).] In so holding, he has discounted the elements of "making or drawing and issuing" of the worthless check, or "knowledge" by the drawer "at the time of issue" that he has insufficient funds to cover it, or having sufficient funds, "shall fail" to cover the full amount of the check within ninety days from issuance.

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the private respondents knew at the time they issued the two checks in question that they had not enough funds in the drawee bank to cover the said checks. "Knowledge," therefore, as an essential ingredient of the offense charged and as defined in the statute, is, by itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Being so, it is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court.

The act of issuing the bum checks, as charged in the informations, furthermore, is a malum prohibitum.  3 [Lozano v. Martines, supra, 334.] As such, it is committed by the very fact of its performance. 4.Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186 (1970).] In that event, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information.  5 [Supra, 189, citing Mediante v. Ortiz, L-19425, 27 April 1967, 19 SCRA 832 (1967); Arches v. Bellosillo, 46 O.G. 71]. In this case, the information states that the offense was committed in Bacolod City. The legal requirements set forth in Rule 110, Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Court as amended have, therefore, been substantially complied with.

Justice Sarmiento, SECOND DIVISION, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HERBERTO A. MANZANILLA, Presiding Judge, Branch XLVII, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, LOURDES TAN CHUA and JOHNNY TAN CHUA, respondents, [G.R. Nos. L-66003-04.  December 11, 1987.]

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of BP Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes [24 Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 408, 416 [1995]].and so is the crime of estafa. 25.    Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 278, 284 [1971]. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 26 [Lim vs. Court of Appeals, supra.]

Justice Hermosisima, Jr.,  FIRST DIVISION, ANTONIO NIEVA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 95796-97.  May 2, 1997.]