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We shall analyze the evidence,
purportedly establishing each of the aforementioned elements which the
trial and the appellate courts relied upon.
Issuance of the Questioned
Checks
Contending that the
prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner maintains that
she merely signed the questioned checks, without indicating therein the
date and the amount involved. She adds that they were improperly filled up
by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she concludes, she did not "issue"
the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
which defines "issue" as the "first delivery of the
instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder."19
[Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 32; rollo, p. 220.]
Petitioner’s contentions are
not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A"
to "K," contained the date of issue and the amount involved. In
fact, petitioner even admitted that she signed those checks. On the other
hand, no proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely signed them in
blank, or that complainant filled them up in violation of the former's
instructions or their previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear
that petitioner issued eleven checks, all of which were duly filled up and
signed by her.
Checks Dishonored
Neither are we persuaded by
petitioner’s argument that "there appears no evidence on record
that the subject checks were unpaid and dishonored."20
[Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 35; rollo, p. 223.] Under
Section 3 of BP 22, "the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and
dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or
written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as
aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance
of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor
thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written,
stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
In the present case, the fact
that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the checks
themselves, which were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT CLOSED."
This was further supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI
Bank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been dishonored.
Clearly, these documents
constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the
checks. Again, no evidence was presented to rebut the prosecution’s
claim.
Knowledge of Insufficiency of
Funds
To hold a person liable under
BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently
dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check
knew "at the time of issue that that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment." Because this element involves a state of
mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:21
[See also Crisologo-Jose v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 594,
September 15, 1989; Travel-On, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA
351, June 26, 1992 and People v. Singson, 215 SCRA 534, November
12, 1992.]
"Sec. 2. Evidence
of knowledge of insufficient funds. --- The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because
of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee
of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check
is issued. But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise
when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity
to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution.
As the Court held in Lozano v. Martinez, the aforecited provision
serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application."22
[146 SCRA 324, December 18, 1986, per Yap, CJ.] This opportunity,
however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of
dishonor. This point was underscored by the Court in Lina Lim Lao v.
Court of Appeals:23
[274 SCRA 572, 594, June 20, 1997, per Panganiban, J. Citations
omitted.]
"It has been observed
that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator ‘a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to
preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action
is abated.’ This was also compared ‘to certain laws allowing
illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender
the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring
any criminal liability.’ In this light, the full payment of the
amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.
Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of
fairness require -- that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to
and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under BP 22."
Thus, in order to create the prima
facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds,
it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within
five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or
make arrangement for its payment.
To prove that petitioner knew
of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented Exhibits
"Q" to "T." Based on these documents, the Court of
Appeals concluded that "[p]rivate complainant sent a demand letter to
appellant to make good said checks x x x. Appellant failed to pay the face
value of the eleven checks or make arrangement for the full payment
thereof within 90 days after receiving the notice."24
[CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 62.]
Upon closer examination of
these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the holding of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a notice that the
checks had been dishonored.
True, complainant sent
petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q", informing
the latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that
petitioner did not receive it. In fact, Postmaster
Wilfredo Ulibarri’s letter addressed to complainant’s counsel
certified that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender on
September 22, 1992 x x x."25
[Exhibit "T," Records, p. 20.]
Notwithstanding the clear
import of the postmaster’s certification, the prosecution failed to
adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but
unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that
the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution
did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner
actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee
from complainant by staying in different addresses. Speculations and
possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction must
rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand
demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive
notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption
that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
Be that as it may, the Court
must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner’s civil liability, for
the issue was not raised in the pleadings submitted before us.
We must stress that BP 22,
like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.26
[Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), p. 208; Nitafan, Notes and
Comments on the Bouncing Checks Law, p. 21.] Likewise, the
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt each element
of the crime. Hence, the prosecution’s case must rise or fall on the
strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of
that of the defense.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. SET ASIDE. SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Betty King is ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crimes
charged. No pronouncement as to costs.
Justice
Panganiban, Third Division King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2,
1999
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