When arraigned,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the
prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case, petitioner filed
a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial
court denied the Demurrer in its assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the demurrer to evidence without prior leave of
court is DENIED for lack of merit.
Since accused has
waived her right to present evidence, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 in the eleven (11) above-entitled cases and is
ordered to:
1. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P50,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3335;
2. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P50,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3336;
3. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P50,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3337;
4. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P64,200.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P64,200.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3338;
5. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P66,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P66,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3339;
6. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P100,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3340;
7. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P150,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3341;
8. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P150,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3342;
Sppedä jo
9. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P130,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P130,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3343;
10. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P130,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P130,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3344; and,
11. Suffer imprisonment
for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P130,000.00,
and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P130,000.00
as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3345."8
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; rolo, pp. 98-99.]
As already stated, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in this wise:9
[CA Decision, p. 12; rollo, p. 63.]
"WHEREFORE, the
appealed decision is hereby affirmed [I]N TOTO. Costs against
appellant."
Hence, this Petition.10
[This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 19, 1999, upon
receipt by the Court of the respondent's Memorandum.]
xxx
Whether or not the trial
court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring that Rule 118,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as applied in the case of Fule vs.
Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 446, which states that no agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used
in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by
him and his counsel, is inapplicable in the case at bar;
xxx
Admissibility of
Documentary Evidence
Because the first, the
second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to the same
matter, they will be discussed together. She contends that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution during pretrial are
inadmissible, because she did not sign the pretrial agreement as
required under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.15
["Sec. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. --- No
agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing
and signed by him and his counsel."] Hence, she argues that
there is no basis for her conviction.
True, a pretrial
agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the conviction
of petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents
submitted during the trial, all of which were admitted without any
objection from her counsel. During the hearing on September 17, 1993,
the prosecution offered as evidence the dishonored checks, the return
check tickets addressed to private complainant, the notice from
complainant addressed to petitioner that the checks had been dishonored,
and the postmaster’s letter that the notice had been returned to
sender. Petitioner's counsel did not object to their admissibility. This
is shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
hearing on September 17, 1993:
"COURT:
You have no objection to the
admissibility, not that the Court will believe it.
ATTY. MANGERA
COURT:
Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘A’ to ‘K’
are admitted.
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
We offer Exhibit ‘L’, the
return-check ticket dated July 27, 1992, relative to checks No. 021745
and 021746 indicating that these checks were returned DAIF, drawn
against insufficient funds; Exh. M, returned check ticket dated July
28, 1992, relative to Check No. 021727, 021711 and 021720 likewise
indicating the said checks to have been drawn against insufficient
funds, Your Honor. Exhibit N, returned check ticket dated July 29,
1992, relative to Check Nos. 021749 and 021748, having the same
indications;
Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated
July 29, 1992 relative to Check Nos. 021750 and 021753, with the same
indications;
Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated
August 4, 1992 relative to Check No. 021752, having the same
indication as being drawn against insufficient funds;
Oldmisâ o
Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the
accused by Atty. Horacio Makalintal dated August 3, 1992;
Exhibit R, the letter-request for
certification addressed to the Postmaster General sent by the same law
office dated 17 September 1992, showing that the said letter was
dispatched properly by the Central Post Office of Makati;
Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati
Central Post Office dated 21 September 1992;
Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal
Corporation Central Post Office letter dated 24 September 1992,
addressed to this representation showing that there were 3 notices sent
to the herein accused who received the said letter.
COURT:
Let’s go to the third check slip; any
objection to the third slip?
Ncmâ
ATTY. MANGERA:
We have no objection as to the due
execution and authenticity.
COURT:
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T,
for the purpose of showing that there was demand duly made on the
accused and that the same had been appropriately served by the Central
Post Office Services of Manila.
ATTY. MANGERA:
We admit as to the due execution and
authenticity only as to that portion, Your Honor.
COURT:
We are talking of admissibility now, so
admitted. In other words, at this point, he makes an offer and the
Court will either grant admission, [admit] it in evidence or deny it.
It can deny admission if it is not properly identified etcetera.
ATTY. MANGERA:
Joä spped
I think it is already provided.
COURT:
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
With the admission of our offer, Your
Honor, the prosecution rests."16
[TSN, September 17, 1993; pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 82-84.]
From the foregoing, it is
clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents offered and
admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule
v. Court of Appeals17
[162 SCRA 446, June 22, 1988.] would not apply to the present
controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted during which the
prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was
"based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial
on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his
counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in evidence
under Section 4 of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of
his guilt.
In the present case,
petitioner’s conviction was based on the evidence presented during
trial, and not on the stipulations made during the pretrial. Hence,
petitioner’s admissions during the trial are governed not by
the Fule ruling or by Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of
Rule 129 which reads: MisÓ sc
"SEC. 4. Judicial
Admissions. --- An admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made."
Hence, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the said
documentary evidence.
Justice
Panganiban, Third Division King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2,
1999
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