In the present case, the petitioner issued the bouncing checks in question to cover the receipt of an actual "account or for value". The checks were issued to pay for the flour and other baking materials which he purchased from the complainant.

Then too, the issues raised here primarily relate to questions of fact. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is confined to the review of errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose findings of fact are conclusive. Therefore, absent any showing that the findings by the respondent court are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand. (Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 440; Morales vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 197 SCRA 391) 

Justice PURISIMA, THIRD DIVISION, [G.R. Nos. 116566 & 120149.  April  14, 1999.]

Hence, this petition whereby petitioner Villaluz assails the finding of the appellate court concerning her civil liability on the B.P. 22 case, claiming that the trial court ruled that she has no liability to private respondents. Alternatively, petitioner Villaluz argues that if she is so liable, the price of the properties she sold to the latter should be set-off with said obligation. She also questions the award of attorney's fees to private respondents. 12 [ Rollo, p. 17. ]The other petitioners contend that the civil case in B.P. 22 constitutes a prejudicial question to the ejectment case and that the one-year period for filing the latter suit had already prescribed.

During the pendency of this petition, a counter-attachment bond was filed by petitioner Villaluz before this Court to discharge the attachment earlier issued by the trial court. Said bond amounting to P2.5 million was furnished by Security Pacific Assurance, Corp. which agreed to bind itself "jointly and severally" with petitioner for "any judgment" that may be recovered by private respondent against the former.

Upon review of the case, the Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

First, the contention of petitioner Villaluz essentially strikes at a factual question. It is well settled, however, that cases brought to this Court from the CA are limited to a review of questions of law, as the factual findings thereon are conclusive on this Court.  13 [ Government v. NLRC, 314 Phil. 507; Navarro v. CA, 209 SCRA 612 (1992); The New Testament Church of God v. CA, 316 Phil. 330; Chan v. CA, 33 SCRA 737 (1970)] In addition, it is also well-settled that the factual findings of the trial court if supported by substantial evidence on record are likewise conclusive on this Court and even carries more weight when affirmed by the CA. 14 [ Meneses v. CA, 316 Phil 210] These doctrines find applicability in this case considering that the assailed findings do not fall under any of the recognized exceptions where the lower courts' factual findings are not binding on this Court. 15 [Republic v. CA, 258 SCRA 712 (1996). The exceptions are: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; and 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based ] No adequate reason appears for the Court to disturb the following ruling of the trial court, to wit:

"But the court is convinced the amount reflected in the check was the total obligation due the complainant from the accused at the time it was issued." 16 [Rollo, p. 20.]

as well as those of the appellate court that:

"It could not be doubted, however, that accused (petitioner Villaluz) bought a vessel from complainant (Anzures); that accused did not pay the purchase price of the vessel; and that accused issued a check in favor of complainant, in the amount of P2,123,400.00, which, certainly, was the amount of accused's indebtedness to complainant. 17 [CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 42.]

Moreover, it is totally misleading for petitioner Villaluz's to say that the trial court found that she has no liability to private respondents. The mere fact that the trial court as affirmed by the CA ordered her to pay P2,123,400.00 to private respondents belies her claim. In addition, it is absurd for her to issue checks 18 [         Rollo, p. 127] in such a huge amount to private respondents had this not been for the satisfaction of a monetary obligation. It is well to emphasize at this point, that though petitioner was acquitted of the criminal offense, she may still be held civilly liable for the checks she issued. Such pronouncement as to her civil liability is sanctioned under Section 2 of Rule 120 which provides in part:

"In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party."

It is not also disputed that petitioner Villaluz bought a vessel from private respondents where they agreed that payment shall be made upon their arrival in Manila for which the former issued the checks. In turn, petitioner Villaluz allegedly sold to the latter certain properties where the payment thereof will be set-off for the value of the vessel. These circumstances show that petitioner Villaluz is indeed obliged to private respondents for the value of the checks. She cannot claim that the checks were worthless as they were allegedly issued without consideration. As a negotiable instrument, the checks were presumed to have been issued for some valuable consideration,  19 [ Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (ACT No. 2031)] which presumption petitioner Villaluz failed to controvert.

As for the set-off of obligations, the Court cannot rule on such issue for as the CA appropriately ruled:

"neither the accused (petitioner) nor the complainant (private respondents) offered sufficient evidence to support or substantiate their respective allegations. And we could not speculate on matters which were not duly proven. Moreover, it is beyond our competence to take into account and determine said claims and counterclaims. We are only concerned about the civil aspect of the criminal case instituted against accused, for violation of B.P. 22 wherein the civil liability is limited to the face value of the subject check." 20 [ CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 45]

With respect to the issue of attorney's fees and costs, the CA correctly disposed of the same as follows:

"The award of attorney's fees, and the costs of suit in favor of complainant is justified under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, the provisions of which are as follows:

'Art. 2208.            In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

(2)        When the defendant's acts or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

(5)        Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim;

considering that accused ignored complainant's demands for her to pay the purchase price of the vessel, which she bought from complainant, and considering further that the check she issued, not until after several demands made to her, in payment of her obligation bounced for reason of "account closed", and that she did not make good of said check." 21 [CA Decision, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 45-46]

Justice Francisco, THIRD DIVISION, TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN, Spouses ADOR and TESS TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA ANZURES, respondents, [G.R. No. 106214.  September 5, 1997.]