In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much more, had any “transaction” with her.  According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan.  She gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a “security arrangement” or “guarantee” that she would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.¹⁶ [Rollo, p. 13.]

The appeal has no merit.

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:¹⁷ [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000.]

“(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

“(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

“(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.”

Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks.  She argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing transaction.  The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.¹⁸ [Rollo, p. 13.] These defenses cannot save the day for her.  The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present.  To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient.  She did not prove this.

B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first an third elements of the offense are present.¹⁹ [B.P. 22, Section 2 provides, “Sec. 2 Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of Knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.²⁰ [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.]

The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.  And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.²¹ [King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.] The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.²² [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.] Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief.²³ Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, 351 (1999).] Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability.  The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.²⁴ [Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 (1997).]

Unlike in estafa,²⁵ [People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999.] under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage.  The damage done is to the banking system.²⁶ [Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 658 (1998).]

In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita²⁷ [United States v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 131 (1909).]--

“… it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent.  In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.  This is necessarily so.  If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless.  It would be impossible of execution.  In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid.   In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad.”

This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita.  Petitioner issued two checks.  They were dishonored upon presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was closed.  Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks.  And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor.  B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated.  Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est.  The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.  

En Banc, Justice Pardo, ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, [G.R. No. 130038.  September 18, 2000]  

Undaunted, the petitioner is before this court for the reversal of the aforesaid judgments convicting him. Invoking the ruling in Magno vs. CA (210 SCRA 471 [1992]), petitioner maintains that he cannot be convicted for violation of B.P. 22 because several factors militate against a strict application of the mala prohibita doctrine, viz.: (1) the checks were not issued "to apply on account or for value" but as mere warranty deposits to guarantee his obligation in the new partnership; (2) that the profits of the business of the partnership have more than paid his (petitioner's) account for the baking materials he bought, for the payment of which subject checks were issued. 

As the drawer of the dishonored checks complained of, although intended merely as a guarantee deposit, the petitioner is liable under B.P. Blg 22.

A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ." (Cruz vs. CA, 233 SCRA 307 [1994])

When a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank normally honors the same whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation.

What is penalized by law is the issuance of a bouncing check. The mere act of issuing an unfunded check is a malum prohibitum. (ibid., p. 301)

In Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160, the court ruled:

"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. . . .

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee."  

and in People vs. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 84, ratiocinated:

"We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not to be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls due. The understanding may be manifested by writing across the check 'Memorandum', 'Memo' or 'Mem'. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. . . ." (G.R. No. 116566, CA Decision dated December 29, 1993, Rollo, pp. 52-53)

The importance of arresting the proliferation of bouncing checks can not be overemphasized. The mischief of circulating unfunded checks is injurious not only to the payee or holder of such checks but to society in general, and the business community, in particular. The nefarious practice "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." (Cruz vs. CA, supra, p. 308)

Petitioner's stance that the complainant tried to enrich herself unjustly by collecting on already paid checks is anemic of evidentiary support. No evidence of any weight whatsoever was introduced to show a set-off or compensation of the monetary obligations for which the checks in question were issued. It has been established indubitably that the petitioner had drawn and issued the said checks in favor of the complainant as payment of the flour and other baking materials the former bought from the latter. When such checks were deposited, they were all dishonored and returned by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed." (TSN, pp. 22-24, July 6, 1994)

The straightforward testimony of the complainant that she agreed with petitioner to redate the same checks, after he pleaded for an extension of time for the payment thereof, is worthy of belief. Had the indebtedness covered by the checks sued upon been paid, the petitioner would have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business. (Section 3 [q] Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines) But the same checks remained in the possession of the complainant who asked for the satisfaction of the obligations involved when said checks became due without the petitioner heeding the demand for him to redeem his checks which bounced.   

Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in the case of Magno vs. Court of Appeals (supra) is misplaced. In said case the accused, who was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, was provided with credit facilities by LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from MANCOR the needed equipments. As part of their arrangement, LS Finance required a 30% warranty deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments to be transacted upon, and the accused subsequently issued checks to collateralize an accommodation made by Corazon Teng (Vice President of MANCOR) amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred (P29,700.00) Pesos as warranty deposit but the said checks bounced. Found guilty under B.P. Blg. 22, the court stressed, on appeal, that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by the accused who was just paying rental on the equipments. To charge him for the refund of a "warranty deposit" he did not withdraw because it was not his own account and it remained with LS Finance, would be to make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since he did not actually receive the amount involved.

In the present case, the petitioner issued the bouncing checks in question to cover the receipt of an actual "account or for value". The checks were issued to pay for the flour and other baking materials which he purchased from the complainant.

THIRD DIVISION, Justice Purisima, DOMINGO DICO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 116566 & 120149.  April  14, 1999.]

In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was that all the elements of the offense were committed in Kalookan City. The checks were issued at their place of business, received by a collector of LINTON, and dishonored by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever supports the proposition that they knew that their checks were insufficiently funded. In fact, some of the checks were funded at the time of presentment but dishonored nonetheless upon their instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine, considering that the checks were all issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried the case and rendered judgment thereon.

The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. . .." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless check  19 [Cruz V. MC, G.R. No. 66327, 28 May 1984, 129 SCRA 490] Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in  20 [Lozano V. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323; Dingle v. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, 16 March 1987, 148 SCRA 595] or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.  21 [People v. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 279]

It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction.  22 [Lopez v. City Judge, No. l-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA; U.S. v. Pagadayuman, 5 Phil. 265 (1905); U.S. v. Reyes, 1 Phil. 249 (1902); Ragpala v. J.P. of Tubo, Lanao, 109 Phil. 265 (1905); Agbayani v. Sayo, No. L-47889, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 699] Section 14, par. (a), Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Sec. 15, par. (a), Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:

Sec. 14.            Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.  23 [People v. Yabut, No. L-42902, 29 April 1977, 76 SCRA 624]There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other.   24 [Tuzon v. Cruz, No. L-27410, 28 August 1975, 66 SCRA 235]These are the so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 25 [People v. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 7405-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154]

In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime and requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7) checks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; (b) they were delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in Kaloocan City, it is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored.

Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a b- or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. In People v. Yabut  26 [Note 23, p. 629] this Court explained —

. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means '(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.' Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto . . .

Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City, they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee. As this Court further explained in People v. Yabut  27 [1d., p.630] —

Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Oue Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr., in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alida P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as 'payee' or 'indorsee.' And there appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that Yambao is but her 'messenger' or 'part-time employee.' There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential. The principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so as to act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent . . .

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds as follows —

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) barking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases before us because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People v. Grospe  28 [See Note 25] citing People v. Manzanilla  29 See Note 21. we held that ". . . knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another."

Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim V. Rodrigo  30 [G.R. No. 76974, 18 November 1988, 167 SCRA 487] that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.  31 Adm. Order No. 3 defines the territorial jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region by, inter aljci, establishing two branches over the municipalities of Malabon and Navotas with seats in Malabon.

We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 thus —

Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were not those specified by them. They maintain that they had sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The records of the bank, however, reveal otherwise. The two letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and August 10, 1983 which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial, complaining against the quality of the goods delivered by the latter, did not refer to the delivery of mild steel plates (6 mm x 4 x 8) and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which the checks in question were issued. Rather, the letters referred to B.1. Lally columns (Sch. #20), which were the subject of other purchase orders.

It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case brought by them against the complainant in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921) the complainant was held liable for actual damages because of the delivery of goods of inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the supplies involved in that case were those of B.1. pipes, while the purchases made by accused-appellants, for which they issued the checks in question, were purchases of mild steel plates and "Z" purlins.

Indeed, the only question here is whether accused-appellants maintained funds sufficient to cover the amounts of their checks at the time of issuance and presentment of such checks. Section 3 of B.P. Big. 22 provides that 'notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of dishonor that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of the check, if such be the fact.'

The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the maker or drawer of a worthless check from ordering the payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext for the lack of sufficient funds to cover the check.

In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the drawee bank, indicates not only that payment of the check was stopped but also that the reason for such order was that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with which to cover the checks. . . . Moreover, the bank ledger of accused-appellants' account in Consolidated Bank shows that at the time the checks were presented for encashment, the balance of accused-appellants' account was inadequate to cover the amounts of the checks.  32 [Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 1-17; Rollo, pp. 54-55]

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 September 1992 affirming the conviction of petitioners Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim —

Justice Bellosillo, FIRST DIVISION, MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, G.R. No. 107898.  December 19, 1995

Syllabus from Lex Libris

ID.; ID.; DISHONOR OF CHECK BY DRAWEE BANK; PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF MAKING OR ISSUANCE OF CHECK AND DUE PRESENTMENT THEREOF. — Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefore, shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the  due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof . . . for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawer on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

Decision

CJ Yap;

xxx

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor," shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof . . . for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." 6

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

xxx

EN BANC, CJ Yap, FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.[G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986.]

The act of issuing the bum checks, as charged in the informations, furthermore, is a malum prohibitum.  3 [Lozano v. Martines, supra, 334.] As such, it is committed by the very fact of its performance. 4.Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186 (1970).] In that event, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information.  5 [Supra, 189, citing Mediante v. Ortiz, L-19425, 27 April 1967, 19 SCRA 832 (1967); Arches v. Bellosillo, 46 O.G. 71]. In this case, the information states that the offense was committed in Bacolod City. The legal requirements set forth in Rule 110, Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Court as amended have, therefore, been substantially complied with.

Justice Sarmiento, SECOND DIVISION, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HERBERTO A. MANZANILLA, Presiding Judge, Branch XLVII, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, LOURDES TAN CHUA and JOHNNY TAN CHUA, respondents, [G.R. Nos. L-66003-04.  December 11, 1987.]

The argument on petitioner's second issue has likewise no leg to stand on. On this argument that he issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of which he is the Manager, We give our stamp of approval on the findings of the appellate court, to wit:

"Neither may appellant's claim in his second assignment of error that the accused issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. serve to exculpate accused from criminal liability for his act of issuing the checks in question.

"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record) First Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036)

"Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee." (pp. 4-5. Dec. IAC) (pp. 37-38, Rollo)

From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

Justice Paras, SECOND DIVISION, VICTOR QUE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 75217-18.  September 21, 1987.]