D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision,1
[Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and concurred by
Associate Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Pacita Canizares-Nye.]
Resolution,2
[Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr, and concurred by
Associate Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (vice
Pacita Canizares-Nye).] and Supplemental
Resolution3
[Ibid.] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 38522.
The facts that matter are
as follows:
Petitioner issued
fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Million Nine Hundred
Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Five and 10/100 (P3,989,175.10)
Pesos, all of which checks were dishonored upon presentment to the
drawee bank.
On October 12, 1993, the
petitioner was charged with fifty-four (54) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 ("BP 22") in fifty-four (54) separate
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 102009 to 102062,
respectively, before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City. To the said accusations, petitioner pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. After trial, she was found guilty in a Decision promulgated
on December 20, 1994, sentencing her to a total prison term of
fifty-four (54) years and to pay P3,989,175.10 to the
private respondent.
Petitioner therefore,
filed an application for probation, which was referred by Presiding
Judge Umali to the Probation Officer of Marikina, for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
Private respondent
opposed subject application for probation on the grounds that: the
petitioner is not eligible for probation because she has been sentenced
to suffer an imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years, and she failed to
pay her judgment debt to the private respondent.
On January 6, 1995,
private respondent presented a "Motion for a Writ of
Execution", which motion was granted by Judge Umali in an Order
dated January 11, 1995. Thus, the corresponding writ of execution issued
for the implementation and satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the
said Decision. Thereafter, the sheriff prepared and signed a Notice of
Levy on Execution over several properties belonging to the petitioner.
On February 13, 1995,
petitioner and her husband executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale"
deeding out in favor of Teodoro S. Dijamco ("Mr. Dijamco") for
P264,570.00 a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet
("Benguet Property"), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18721 ("TCT No. T-18721"). On the same day, the sheriff
annotated the Notice of Levy on Execution on the dorsal portion of TCT
No. T-18721.
On March 29, 1995, Mr.
Dijamco filed an "Affidavit of Third-Party-Claim" over the
same Benguet property on the strength of the said previous sale but
averring already a consideration of P3,000,000.00.
Attached thereto are the checks he allegedly paid for subject property.
On May 5, 1995, private
respondent interposed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the
application for probation; contending that:
"x x x
2. Recent developments
show that the accused had been disposing and/or mortgaging her
properties in obvious attempt to negate the satisfaction of her civil
liability to herein private complainant, as evidenced by the Affidavit
of Third Party Claim filed by Teodoro S. Dijamco and the Real Estate
Mortgage executed by the accused in favor of the Rural Bank of Angono,
Inc. (attached as Annexes "A" and "B" in the
Comment/Opposition to the Post Sentence Investigation Report).
3. It must be stressed
that the real estate mortgage was executed by the accused in
anticipation of an unfavorable judgment and that the alleged sale the
real property in favor of Teodoro Dijamco was made after this
Honorable Court had rendered judgment convicting the accused of the
crime charged and after notice of levy on execution had been annotated
on the title. Clearly, the said mortgage and sale executed by the
accused constitute indirect contempt under Sec. 3 of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court and the accused may likewise be prosecuted criminally
for the said acts. nigel
4. Moreover, the
accused is disqualified from the benefits of the aforecited Decree as
she has been sentenced to a total of fifty four (54) years of
imprisonment.
5. From the foregoing,
it is crystal clear that the accused is not entitled to the benefits
of the probation law and that the acts enumerated constitute indirect
contempt."
In the Order he issued on
June 30, 1995, Judge Umali granted petitioner’s application for
probation for a period of six (6) years, subject to the following terms
and conditions, to wit:
"1. Probationer
shall report initially to the Chief parole and Probation Officer at
Marikina Parole & Probation Off. Hall of Justice, Marikina within
seventy-two hours from receipt of the Order granting Probation.
2. She shall,
thereafter, report to her supervising probation and parole officer 2
times a month, unless otherwise modified by the Chief Probation and
Parole Officer.
3. She shall reside in
#8 Jazmin, Twinsville Subd. Concepcion, Marikina and shall not change
her residence without approval of the supervising probation and parole
officer or of the Court, as the case may be.
4. She shall secure a
written permit to travel outside the jurisdiction of the parole and
probation office from the chief probation officer, and from the Court
if such travel exceeds thirty (30) days.
5. She shall allow the
supervising probation officer, or an authorized Volunteer Aide to
visit her place of work and home.
6. She shall meet her
family responsibilities.
7. She shall devote
herself to a specific employment and shall not change said employment
without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a
prescribed secular study or vocational training.
8. She shall refrain
from associating with persons of questionable character, and shall not
commit any other offense.
9. She shall cooperate
with her program of supervision, and shall satisfy any other condition
related to her rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of her
liberty or incompatible with her freedom of conscience.
10. She shall plant at
least five (5) fruit bearing trees in his backyard or any government
lot as part of her rehabilitation.
11. She shall
participate in the Parole and Probationer’s Project as clean and
green project in Marikina and attend the First Friday Mass at the Hall
of Justice of Marikina."
Private respondent moved
for reconsideration but to no avail. Her motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Dissatisfied, the private
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questioning the grant of probation.
In its Decision4 [Rollo, pp. 28-52.] dated August 16,
1996, the Court of Appeals ruled thus:
"IN THE LIGHT OF
ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Respondent Judge, Annexes "A" and "B" of the
Petition are SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to
the Court a quo. The Respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the Private Respondent."
Private respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration5
[Rollo, pp. 53-68.] of the above
Decision but the same was denied in the Resolution6
[Rollo, pp. 92-93.] dated January 7,
1997, holding:
"Anent Private
Respondent’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration’, We find no valid
justification for a reversal or reconsideration of our Decision.
Private Respondent’s claim that the Petitioner is not the proper
party-in-interest to file the Petition is barren of merit. In the
first place, the Private Respondent, in her Answer/Comment and the
Public Respondent, in his Comment, on the Petition, never claimed that
the Petitioner was not the proper party-in-interest to file the
Petition. More, the Solicitor General appearing for the Public
Respondent has not filed any ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ of our
Decision. Evidently, the Solicitor General is in accord with our
Decision.
Anent Petitioner’s
‘Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order’, We find the
said motion meritorious and hereby grants the same. Accordingly, the
Commissioner & Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed not
to allow the departure from the Philippines of the Private Respondent
Marilyn C. Santos, married, and a resident of No. 8 Jasmin Street,
Twinville Subdivision, Marikina City, until further orders of this
Court.
SO ORDERED."
In a Supplemental
Resolution7
[Rollo, pp. 95-96.] dated January
29, 1997, the Court of Appeals elucidated further its Resolution that
the herein petitioner is the real party-in-interest, and declared that
there were no procedural lapses in the granting of private
respondent’s petition.
Having lost the case
before the Court of Appeals, petitioner has come to this Court for
relief; contending that:
I
PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CORAZON T. CASTRO IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO QUESTION THE
GRANT OF PROBATION TO HEREIN PETITIONER.
II
NON-PAYMENT OF THE CIVIL
LIABILITY IMPOSED ON PETITIONER IN THE DECISION RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE REVOCATION OF PROBATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
MORE INTERESTED IN THE FULL SATISFACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON
T. CASTRO RELATIVE TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CASE THAN IN THE
REHABILITATION OF PETITIONER AS A PROBATIONER. THIS IS HIGHLY IMPROPER.
IV
THE GRANT OF PROBATION TO
PETITIONER MARILYN C. SANTOS IS FAIT ACCOMPLI AND SHE HAS COMPLIED WITH
THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBATION GRANTED HER.
V
THE GRANT OF PROBATION BY
JUDGE UMALI TO PETITIONER UNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A "HOLD DEPARTURE
ORDER" TO PREVENT PETITIONER FROM LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES.
Anent the first issue,
the Court holds that the private respondent had the personality to bring
a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Being the person aggrieved by petitioner’s issuance of
bouncing checks, private respondent has an interest in the civil aspect
of the case. It is not true that it is only the State or the People that
can prosecute the special civil action before the Court of Appeals.
Private respondent may bring such action in her own name to protect her
interest in the case.
"In a special
civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant.
The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he
may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action
of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of
the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said
complainant." (People v. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143, 153)
* * *
"In the instant
case, the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court was
therefore proper since it was brought in his own name and not in that
of the People of the Philippines. That the said proceedings benefited
the People is not a reversible error. Neither does it constitute grave
abuse of discretion. xxx" (De
la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 501, 508)
Anent the second, third,
and fifth issues, erroneous is petitioner’s submission that the Court
of Appeals unduly stressed petitioner’s non-satisfaction of her civil
liability as the basis for reversing the grant of probation to her. The
proper approach to the problem, and the Court considers the same as the
pivotal issue in this case, is whether the petitioner is entitled to
probation.
The point of conflict is
whether the petitioner is qualified to be granted probation. Stated
otherwise, has petitioner shown her qualifications entitling her to the
grant of probation? Is society better off with petitioner in jail or
should petitioner be allowed to co-mingle with the people, subject to
some conditions, despite her criminal record?
Probation is not a
right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency
or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a seemingly
deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense for which he was convicted.8
[Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384.]
The primary objective in granting probation is the reformation of the
probationer. Courts must be meticulous enough to ensure that the ends of
justice and the best interest of the public as well as the accused be
served by the grant of probation.9
[Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 304.]
Probation is a just
privilege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. Before
granting probation, the court must consider the potentiality of the
offender to reform, together with the demands of justice and public
interest, along with other relevant circumstances.10
[Bernardo v. Balagot, 215 SCRA 526.] The
courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or
recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only
persuasive.11
[Ibid.]
In granting
petitioner’s application for probation, Judge Umali ratiocinated:
"Based on the
report of the probation officer, accused may be granted probation (P.D.
968, as amended) The findings of the Parole and Probation Office shows
that accused is not considered as a rescidivist [sic]; accused
petitioner is not in need of correctional treatment, but more of an
individualize treatment of rehabilitation; offenses committed by
accused/ petitioner is not so grave a crime that she can pose a great
threat in the peace and order of the community where she resides; and
accused/petitioner is not condemned by the community because of her
cases, it can be presumed that she is still welcome to mingle with the
community and participate in any community projects.
Her failure to satisfy
the judgment on the civil liability is not a ground for the denial of
the application for probation of accused. Moreover, the court had
earlier issued a writ of execution to satisfy the money judgment in an
order dated January 11, 1995 and the sheriff of this court had issued
a notice of levy on execution on the properties of accused.
Foregoing considered
that petition of accused for probation is hereby Granted." (Order,
June 30, 1995; Rollo, p. 99)
When the aforesaid order
was assailed before it, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of
probation, on the grounds that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion and petitioner was unworthy of probation; ruling thus:
"As it was, the
Private Respondent had violated, with impunity, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
no less than fifty-four (54) times to the damage and prejudice of the
Petitioner in the aggregate amount of close to P4,000,000.00.
One would believe that the Private Respondent had learned her lesson,
would strive, from then on, to reform, shy away from doing and
abetting injustices to her fellowmen, make amends for her criminal
misdeeds, demonstrate remorse and concomitant determination to reform
and turn a new leaf in her life, and reassume her role as a
responsible and productive member of community. On the contrary, after
escaping from the specter of imprisonment and averting the
tribulations and vicissitudes of a long prison term, by applying for
and securing probation from the Respondent Judge, Private Respondent
resorted to devious chicanery and artifice to prevent Petitioner from
recovering her losses and perpetrate reprehensible if not criminal
acts of falsification of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in
favor of Dijamco over her Benguet property, thus flaunting, once
again, her mockery and defiance of justice, foul play and unabashedly
making gross misrepresentations to the Probation Officer.
In fine, then, We find
and so declare that the Respondent Judge abused his discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting probation to the Private
Respondent. Accordingly, We find and so declare that the Orders
complained of, Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ of the Petition are null
and void." (Decision, p. 24; Rollo, p. 51)
The Court finds merit in
the determination by the Court of Appeals that the herein petitioner is
not entitled to probation because she had displayed a devious and
reprehensible character in trying to evade the implementation of the
execution against her thereby rendering the judgment against her
ineffective; as indicated by the following facts and circumstances, to
wit:
1. On February 13,
1995, petitioner disposed of her Benguet property by means of a
"Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Mr. Dijamco and had the
deed registered in Benguet to preempt the sheriff of the lower court
from causing the "Notice of Levy on Execution" annotated at
the back of the title of the Benguet property.
2. The "Deed of
Absolute Sale" executed in favor of Mr. Dijamco stated a
consideration of P264,570.00 when in truth and in
fact, the consideration was P3,000,000.00, as stated
in the uncontested "Affidavit of Third Party Claim" of Mr.
Dijamco and as evidenced by the checks issued to and encashed by
petitioner. By understating the price, petitioner committed acts of
falsification causing damage to the government as the latter was
deprived of taxes that should have been paid from the sale.
3. There is evidence to
prove that the "Deed of Absolute Sale" may just have been a
simulated sale because petitioner’s husband, in his "Affidavit
of Third Party Claim" dated February 21, 1995, still claimed the
property to be theirs. There is no mention whatsoever of any sale to
Mr. Dijamco.
4. Petitioner never
remitted a single centavo of the proceeds of the "Real Estate
Mortgage" (in favor of Rural Bank of Angono,Inc.) and "Deed
of Absolute Sale" (in favor of Mr. Dijamco) to the private
respondent. If she really had the good intentions of settling and
satisfying the judgment of the trial court, she should have at least
offered a portion of said proceeds to private respondent. Worse, she
exhibited a design to compeletely evade her civil obligation to
private respondent. M
5. Petitioner’s claim
that the Benguet property actually belongs to Corazon Leano is of no
moment and could not be given credence. The documentary evidence
presented in this case overwhelmingly proves that such claim is
puerile and tenuous. Primarily, the "Deed of Absolute Sale"
and "Affidavit of Third Party Claim" (filed by
petitioner’s husband) prove their ownership of the Benguet property.
From the foregoing, it
can be gleaned unerringly that petitioner has shown no remorse for the
criminal acts she committed against the private respondent. Her issuing
subject fifty-four (54) bouncing checks is a serious offense. To allow
petitioner to be placed on probation would be to depreciate the
seriousness of her malefactions. Worse, instead of complying with the
orders of the trial court requiring her to pay her civil liability, she
even resorted to devious schemes to evade the execution of the judgment
against her. Verily, petitioner is not the penitent offender who is
eligible for probation within legal contemplation. Her demeanor
manifested that she is incapable to be reformed and will only be a
menace to society should she be permitted to co-mingle with the public.
With respect to the
fourth issue, petitioner’s contention that her probation is fait
accompli is equally untenable. The six (6) year period of probation
which commenced on June 30, 1995, has not yet been completed.
Furthermore, even if the said period has expired, such lapse of the
period of probation does not detract from the fact that the order
granting probation was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Probation
having been improperly granted, there is no probation to speak of.
Anent the last issue, the
Court rules that the issuance of a "hold departure order"
against the petitioner is warranted under the premises. Having displayed
a criminal tendency and propensity to evade or disobey the lawful orders
of the trial court, there is indeed the need to restrict the
petitioner’s movements and activities so as not to render nugatory the
multiple judgments rendered against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
38522 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug,
Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
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