After a thorough review of the records we find petitioner’s conviction for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 well-founded. B.P. Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of daily business and to avert not only the undermining of the banking system of the country but also the infliction of damage and injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the indiscriminate issuances of such checks. By its very nature, the offenses defined under B.P. Blg. 22 are against public interest. Thus in Lozano v. Martinez26 [G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323, 340. ] we held -

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend (sic) the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch (sic) the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee and holder but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

Justice  Bellosello, SECOND DIVISION, Cueme v. People, G.R. No. 133325. June 31, 2000

Undaunted, the petitioner is before this court for the reversal of the aforesaid judgments convicting him. Invoking the ruling in Magno vs. CA (210 SCRA 471 [1992]), petitioner maintains that he cannot be convicted for violation of B.P. 22 because several factors militate against a strict application of the mala prohibita doctrine, viz.: (1) the checks were not issued "to apply on account or for value" but as mere warranty deposits to guarantee his obligation in the new partnership; (2) that the profits of the business of the partnership have more than paid his (petitioner's) account for the baking materials he bought, for the payment of which subject checks were issued. 

 As the drawer of the dishonored checks complained of, although intended merely as a guarantee deposit, the petitioner is liable under B.P. Blg 22.

A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ." (Cruz vs. CA, 233 SCRA 307 [1994])

When a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank normally honors the same whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation.

What is penalized by law is the issuance of a bouncing check. The mere act of issuing an unfunded check is a malum prohibitum. (ibid., p. 301)

In Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160, the court ruled:

"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. . . .

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee."  

and in People vs. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 84, ratiocinated:

"We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not to be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls due. The understanding may be manifested by writing across the check 'Memorandum', 'Memo' or 'Mem'. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. . . ." (G.R. No. 116566, CA Decision dated December 29, 1993, Rollo, pp. 52-53)

The importance of arresting the proliferation of bouncing checks can not be overemphasized. The mischief of circulating unfunded checks is injurious not only to the payee or holder of such checks but to society in general, and the business community, in particular. The nefarious practice "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." (Cruz vs. CA, supra, p. 308)

Petitioner's stance that the complainant tried to enrich herself unjustly by collecting on already paid checks is anemic of evidentiary support. No evidence of any weight whatsoever was introduced to show a set-off or compensation of the monetary obligations for which the checks in question were issued. It has been established indubitably that the petitioner had drawn and issued the said checks in favor of the complainant as payment of the flour and other baking materials the former bought from the latter. When such checks were deposited, they were all dishonored and returned by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed." (TSN, pp. 22-24, July 6, 1994)

The straightforward testimony of the complainant that she agreed with petitioner to redate the same checks, after he pleaded for an extension of time for the payment thereof, is worthy of belief. Had the indebtedness covered by the checks sued upon been paid, the petitioner would have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business. (Section 3 [q] Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines) But the same checks remained in the possession of the complainant who asked for the satisfaction of the obligations involved when said checks became due without the petitioner heeding the demand for him to redeem his checks which bounced.   

Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in the case of Magno vs. Court of Appeals (supra) is misplaced. In said case the accused, who was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, was provided with credit facilities by LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from MANCOR the needed equipments. As part of their arrangement, LS Finance required a 30% warranty deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments to be transacted upon, and the accused subsequently issued checks to collateralize an accommodation made by Corazon Teng (Vice President of MANCOR) amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred (P29,700.00) Pesos as warranty deposit but the said checks bounced. Found guilty under B.P. Blg. 22, the court stressed, on appeal, that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by the accused who was just paying rental on the equipments. To charge him for the refund of a "warranty deposit" he did not withdraw because it was not his own account and it remained with LS Finance, would be to make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since he did not actually receive the amount involved.

In the present case, the petitioner issued the bouncing checks in question to cover the receipt of an actual "account or for value". The checks were issued to pay for the flour and other baking materials which he purchased from the complainant.

THIRD DIVISION, Justice Purisima, DOMINGO DICO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 116566 & 120149.  April  14, 1999.]

Syllabus from Lex Libris

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BATASANG PAMBANSA; MAY PRESCRIBE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT FOR ACTS INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELFARE; MALUM PROHIBITUM. — It may be constitutionally impermissible for  the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt excontractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

POLICE POWER; BATASANG PAMBANSA 22; VALID EXERCISE THEREOF; NOT REPUGNANT TO CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION AGAINST IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. — The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreason able the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The effect of the issuance of a worthless checks transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. In sum, we find the enactment of B.P. 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

EN BANC, Justice Yap, FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.[G.R. Nos. L-66839-42.  December 18, 1986.]

"Neither may appellant's claim in his second assignment of error that the accused issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. serve to exculpate accused from criminal liability for his act of issuing the checks in question.

"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record) First Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036)

"Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee." (pp. 4-5. Dec. IAC) (pp. 37-38, Rollo)

From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

 Justice Paras, SECOND DIVISION, VICTOR QUE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents, [G.R. Nos. 75217-18.  September 21, 1987.]