In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much more, had any “transaction” with her.  According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan.  She gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a “security arrangement” or “guarantee” that she would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.¹⁶ [Rollo, p. 13.]

The appeal has no merit.

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:¹⁷ [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000.]

“(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

“(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

“(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.”

Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks.  She argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing transaction.  The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.¹⁸ [Rollo, p. 13.] These defenses cannot save the day for her.  The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present.  To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient.  She did not prove this.

B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first an third elements of the offense are present.¹⁹ [B.P. 22, Section 2 provides, “Sec. 2 Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of Knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.²⁰ [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.]

The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.  And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.²¹ [King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999.] The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.²² [Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 17.] Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief.²³ Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333, 351 (1999).] Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability.  The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.²⁴ [Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423 (1997).]

Unlike in estafa,²⁵ [People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999.] under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage.  The damage done is to the banking system.²⁶ [Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 658 (1998).]

In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala prohibita²⁷ [United States v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 131 (1909).]--

“… it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent.  In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.  This is necessarily so.  If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless.  It would be impossible of execution.  In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid.   In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad.”

This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita.  Petitioner issued two checks.  They were dishonored upon presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was closed.  Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks.  And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor.  B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated.  Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est.  The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.  

En Banc, Justice Pardo, ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent, [G.R. No. 130038.  September 18, 2000]  

True, it is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment, or as evidence of indebtedness, if not a mode of payment. But to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. 8 So, what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.  [9]  Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, June 17, 1994, G.R. No. 108738, 233 SCRA 301.

Justice Torres, SECOND DIVISION, RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.,[G.R. No. 99032.  March 26, 1997.]